My Peer-Reviewed Publications
Abductive Reasoning and an Omnipotent God
Sophia 57(3): 515-519. 2018.
Sha256:b4c561ea429dfd18cbe927527b66c8ceea73d2040fd06c5af10d84773a92c55d
ABSTRACT:
Daniel Came boldly argues that given certain assumptions, no omnipotent being can even in principle be the best explanation for some contingent state of afairs S. In this paper, I argue that (i) even give Came’s assumptions, his argument rests crucially on a non sequitur, that (ii) he just assumes that the prior probability of God’s existence is very low, and that (iii) his conclusions entail propositions that are very probably false.
The Undeniable Reality of Evil: A Response to W.J. Mander
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9(4): 239-244. 2017.
Sha256:077e70c11814a2e1f6cf35230d389c80c67297958bef7f043d67fb22cb3aca69
ABSTRACT:
Mander (2017) argues for the bold thesis that the non-existence of evil should be considered by theists as a serious solution to the problem of evil. In this paper, I argue that Mander has failed to show that the Unreality-of-Evil thesis (UET) is a serious solution to the problem of evil. In doing so, I argue that (i) the reality of evil is a Moorean fact, and that (ii) UET implies an unacceptable skepticism about normative knowledge in general. I also argue that UET unacceptably implies that (iii) God endowed us with severely dysfunctional cognitive faculties, and that (iv) failing to fulfill our obligations to God is not bad or evil. Furthermore, I argue that (v) even if one grants UET, the theist has gained nothing substantial: the atheist can just rephrase the problem of evil to be the problem of suffering and pain. Lastly, I argue that (vi) UET is not a viable solution for the majority of theists, whose scriptures unequivocally teach the reality of evil.
My Master’s Thesis
Modal Logic and Ontological Arguments
Sha256:d2e7c82c130ca4566ba6f61099b94344573be01b6917c6894bc7425550533461
ABSTRACT:
In this thesis I will evaluate various modal ontological arguments for the existence of God. I will evaluate Kurt Gödel’s modal ontological argument (as preserved by his student Dana Scott), and Anthony Anderson’s emendation of it. I will conclude that both Gödel’s argument and Anderson’s emendation fail. I then propose a revised version of C’Zar Bernstein’s ontological argument. I conclude that while this argument is not rationally compelling, it is more plausibly sound than not. Finally, I will demonstrate that some extant general objections to modal ontological arguments are unconvincing.
Miscellaneous Papers
Sha256:2bb0dee150042e4da74102fe5e4028c1705f554b8e91579c1de2c068d699b098
Description: This is my unpublished paper on ISIS and Islam, which I authored about a decade ago for a graduate seminar on the Middle East, and which I have hardly modified since. In it I essentially argue that ISIS is indeed an authentically Islamic movement. Although it is not at publishable peer-review quality, I list it on this page because my views have not changed much here and I still think that, although requiring a few touchups and copyediting, the argument of the paper is successful.